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Introduction
OuTwARD-oriented strategies for industrial growth were initiated
in the Philippines in the early 1980s. A trade reform package was
launched, the major components of which were the Tariff Reform
Program (TRP) and the Import Liberalization Program (ILP). The
TRP gradually lowered and rationalized the c6untry's protection
rates, while the ILP lifted a number of import licensing regulations.
The shift in trade policy orientation is aimed at increasing the
efficiency and competitiveness of local industries.
Recent literature concerning trade-productivity nexus points out
that trade liberalization will result to greater total factor productivity
(TFP) growth. Advocates of neoclassical trade theory have strongly
argued that more exposure to international market will induce local
industries to improve their efficiency performance and adopt new
technologies. Although this thesis is widely accepted as the main
avenue for rapid industrial growth, doubts about trade liberalization
remain strong in many circles (Havrylyshyn 1990). One reason for
such doubt is the lack of empirical evidence linking productivity and
openness.
In the height of this debate on trade policy-productivity nexus, a
new literature has emerged which marries the insights of industrial
organization with those of international trade. The "new theory" of
international trade has focused its attention on the role played by
industrial market structure in the analysis. Thus, the main thesis of
this study is that trade liberalization will generate positive effects on
the performance and competitiveness of the agricultural machinery
industry in the Philippines. However, the outcome of trade policy
reforms depends on the industry's market structure and other non-
price factors.2 _ FrancesMyraC.Trabajo
This study aims to evaluate the effects of the Trade Reform,
particularly the TariffReform Program on the structure, performance
and competitiveness of the agricultural machinery industry. It also
tries to identify non-price factors which may have affected the
efficiency and competitiveness of the industry.
For this study, the industry under investigation isthe manufacture
of power-driven agricultural machinery, specifically hand tractors
and power threshers. The industry is said to be import-substitute in
nature, which has remained underprotected. The study by Bautista,
Power and Associates (1979) estimated the industry's effective rate
of protection in 1974 to be at 14 percent, much lower than the 44
percent supply-weighted average for all manufacturers. Notwith-
standing, the advent of trade policy reforms in 1981 did not exclude
the industry in the rationalization of the country's protection struc-
ture. The 1981-1985 TRP reduced the duty rate forhand tractor and
increased the duty rate for power thresher. On the other hand, tariff
rates for inputs were reduced. In 1991, another major tariff restruc-
turing was implemented. Line-by-line tariff adjustments for both
outputs and inputs of the industry are further scheduled until 1995.
Determining how and to what extent the Trade Policy Reform has
affected the industry is therefore a policy concern.
In this paper, Chapter 2 presents areview of empirical studies on
the impact of trade policy orientation on efficiency, competitiveness
and structure at the firm and industry levels. Chapter 3 discusses the
theoreticai framework of the study, while Chapter 4 presents the
different sources of data and measures utilized in the study. A factual
background of the agricultural machinery industry in the Philippines
is presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses and analyzes the
performance of the industry. The final chapter concludes the paper
by pointing out the vital points and offers some policy recommenda-
tions.2
Review of Literature
THE role of trade policy in the process of industrial growth and
economic development has long been a major focus in the develop-
ment literature. However, only a few have explicitly analyzed the
effect of trade policy on efficiency gains. A review of some of these
empirical findings is presented in this chapter.
TRADE POLICY AND PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE
With regard to the trade-productivity nexus literature, the claim
that a more neutral trade policy will generate large efficiency gains
is still ambiguous. Pack (1988) observes that "to date there is no clear
confirmation of the hypothesis that countries with an external orien-
tation benefit from greater growth in technical efficiency in the
components sector in manufacturing." Havrylyshyn (1990) also
notes that doubts about trade liberalization stem from the fact that
there is little evidence that directly link tradereform with productivity
growth.
One of the rare studies that directly investigate the effect of trade
policy on efficiency gains isthat of Krueger and Tuncer (1982). Rates
of growth in total factor productivity (TFP) and absolute levels of
single factor-productivity for two-digit manufacturing industries in
Turkey over the period 1963 to 1976 were estimated. Their results
show that a faster TFP growth was experienced in periods when a
more neutral trade policy was adopted.
In a cross-country comparison of sectoral factor productivity
growth in Korea, Turkey, Yugoslavia, with Japan as comparator, a
positive association between trade openness and productivity per-4 4 FrancesMyraC.Trabajo
formance was examined by Nishimizu and Robinson (1984). Thus,
the following hypotheses were confirmed: (a) export expansion leads
to higher TFP growth through economies of scale and/or through
competitive incentives; (b) increased import substitution (import
liberalization) leads to lower (higher) TFP growth, perhaps through
reducing (increasing) competitive cost-reduction incentives; and (c)
export expansion and import liberalization increases TFP growth by
relaxing the foreign exchange constraint and imports of non-substi-
tutable intermediate and capital goods.
At the firm-level, following Farrell's contribution to the analysis
of production, Hill and Kalirajan (1991) focused on Indonesia's
small-scale garments industry. The explanatory variables closely
associated with high levels of firm-specific technical efficiency were
export orientation, sources of finance, and gender composition of the
workforce (female participation in particular). The authors have
suggested that an export promotion policy and a well-defined credit
market are needed for a successful industrial development.
However, the study by Tybout, de Melo and Corbo (1991) reveals
that comparisons of pre- and post-liberalization manufacturing cen-
sus data of Chile exhibited little productivity improvement overall.
Nonetheless, it was observed that industries undergoing relatively
large reductions in protection experienced relatively large improve-
ments in average efficiency levels and relatively large reductions in
cross-plant .efficiency dispersion. The authors, however, cautioned
that the positive effects of trade reforms on the Chilean manufactur-
ing sector may have been masked by major macroeconomic shocks.
Since there remains to be no strong empirical evidence on the link
between trade policy reforms and efficiency gains from TFP studies,
Havrylyshyn (1990) points out that "the main contributions of an
outward-oriented trade policy to efficiency may arise from the larger
total market available when exports are not discouraged, allowing for
both increased capacity utilization and economies of scale arising
from specialization."
Studies using firm-level data from Ghana and India support the
importance of capacity utilization in explaining differences in effi-
ciency. Using Ghana as model, Page (1980) attempted to link tech-AgriculturalMachineryIndustry _ 5
nical (or managerial) efficiency, the choice of technique, and eco-
nomic performance. To establish the relationship, the study utilized
Farrell's efficiency-frontier methodology and the domestic resource
cost (DRC) criterion. The findings reveal that the level of efficiency
was most affected by the following: (a) correction of factor prices;
(b) move to full capacity utilization; and (c) pure technical efficiency
(i.e., shifts from inefficient use of inputs relative to the optimal level
of production). For India, Page (1984) applied afrontier transcenden-
tal logarithm production function to explore the relationship between
firm size and technical efficiency. Firm size was found to be posi-
tively correlated with relative productive efficiency in only one of
the four selected manufacturing industries. The same industry also
exhibited greatest evidence of plant level scale economies. Although
the study did not reveal a significant association between firm size
and the level of technical efficiency, it was observed that capacity
utilization greatly influenced efficiency. Moreover, the study also
reveals the influence of scale economies on the level of efficiency,
but in a less conclusive manner, due to mixed results for different
manufacturing industries. It must also be noted that not all industries
were subject to economies of scale.
THE "NEW THEORY" OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Research interests of trade and industrial economists for the past
several years have moved closer together. Trade theorists for the past
years focused their analysis mainly on highly competitive market
structures. At present, however, they have stexted to focus their
interest in the trade implications of imperfect market structures and
refer to industrial organization literature forguidance. Studies explor-
ing the "new theory" of international trade, however, are limited.
To capture an international trade dimension, foreign trade vari-
ables are integrated into the traditional market structure-conduct-per-
formance (S-C-P) paradigm. This was done by Pagouiatos and
Sorensen (1976) in their analysis on the structure-profitability rela-
tionship in the industrial sector of the European Economic Commu-6 4 Frances MyraC.Trabajo
nity (EEC). The foreign trade variables were foreign competition,
exporting opportunities, and multinational activity. To assess profit-
ability performance, the price-cost margin was used. It was con-
cluded that the concerned foreign variables were an important
addition to domestic structural variables in explaining inter-industry
differentials in price-cost margins. Seller concentration, one of the
domestic factors used, was only significant in larger EEC economies
and in industries where import competition was insignificant. This
result supported the hypothesis on the positive relationship between
price-cost margin and seller concentration. Moreover, trade openness
(i.e., the elimination of import duties) also fostered greater efficiency
and competition within the member countries of the EEC via market
expansion and increased numbers of competitors within the larger
EEC markets. These effects, as observed, had countered increases in
industry concentration within certain member countries of the EEC.
The study by de Melo and Urata (1986) indicates that the Chilean
liberal trade policy of the mid-1970s reduced profitability perform-
ance as a consequence of an increase in industry concentration. The
contrasting movement of concentration and profitability was attrib-
uted to the following reasons: (a) There was an exploitation of
economies of scale, which resulted from foreign trade exposure and
the exit of small inefficient firms; and (b) Import penetration in-
creased the elasticity of demand facing domestic firms. The study
also found that the sectors with the highest import-penetration ratios
also bared the largest decline in price-cost margins, thus lending
support to the "import-discipline" hypothesis.
Rodrik (1988), in his attempt to examine the likely linkages
between trade policy and technical efficiency, states that the over-
whelming effect of economies of scale on productivity improvements
appeared to be a strong argument for trade openness. The economies
of scale argument, however, relies on the "frictionless entry to and
exit from the industry" assumption. The free entry of additional firms
would result to the reduction of domestic price and would lead some
incumbent firms to exit the industry. The remaining firms would
therefore have to produce at a sufficient scale of output for the
reduced level of average costs to match the lower domestic price.AgriculturalMachineryIndustry ), 7
Furthermore, the author concluded that the argument calls for more
empirical investigation. Tybout, de Melo and Corbo (1991) also
found that increased exposure to foreign competition led to industrial
rationalization. Their results disclose that the remaining firms pro-
duced at output levels closer to minimum efficient scale. These firms
also moved closer toward the efficient technology as suggested by
the technical efficiency coefficients (TECs). As noted earlier in this
chapter, these positive effects of trade reforms on scale and technical
efficiency may have been masked by adverse macro conditions.
Also, in the context of imperfectly competitive markets, Harrison
(1989) examined the impact of trade liberalization on TFP growth
based on a panel of firms in the Ivory Coast. There was a strong
linkage between trade liberalization and productivity growth when
perfect competition in the product markets was assumed. However,
the relationship did not hold when the variations in price-cost margins
brought about by the trade reform were allowed for. Thus, there
seems to be a need to take into account the role played by the
industrial market structure.3
Theoretical Framework
BEFORE the 1980s, the Philippines had been under a more inward-
oriented trade regime. Several studies have pointed out the several
biases in resource allocation brought about by tariff and non-tariff
barriers. High level of protection is associated with high cost and
inefficient use of resources while low level of protection affirms
otherwise. This disappointing effect which translates to dismal indus-
trial performance has, in a way, led the country to embark on a more
outward-oriented trade policies. The twin objective of the Trade
Policy Reform is to rationalize the protection structure of the country
through the Tariff Reform Program (TRP) as well as to ease import
regulations through the Import Liberalization Program (ILP). Spe-
cifically, the TRP is aimed at putting tariff rates on a more uniform
level to reduce excessive protection as well as to increase incentives
to neglected industries at the lower end of the protection scale. Thus,
it is believed that a more neutral trade regime will improve the
efficiency performance and competitiveness of domestic industries.
This chapter provides the framework for analyzing the impact of
trade liberalization on industrial performance. The first section ex-
plains some theoretical considerations of efficiency performance,
competitiveness, and market structure dimension; the second section
deals with the linkages between trade policy reform, efficiency
performance, competitiveness, and industrial market structure; and
lastly, the third section deals with other factors influencing the
performance of the industry.10 _ FrancesMyraC.Trabajo
CONCEPTS: EFFICIENCY PERFORMANCE, COMPETITIVENESS,
AND MARKET STRUCTURE DIMENSION
Efficiency Performance
The analytical framework used in measuring efficiency perform-
ance at the level of thefirm is founded on the economic theory of
production and cost. According to Kirkpatrick and Maharaj (1992),
a distinction can be made between static (allocative and technical)
and dynamic (technological progress) productivity measures based
on the conventional analysis of the firm's pi'oduction and cost rela-
tions. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where PP is the efficient or "best
practice" production frontier, determined by the given state of tech-
nology. Three factor lines -- TC1, TC2 and TC3 m are also shown.
Improvements in efficiency performance may be due to the
Changes in (static) efficiency or changes in (dynamic) technological
progress or productivity. Static efficiency gains can be defined by
comparing points A, B and C in Figure 1. At point A, the firm is said
to be inefficient since it incurs higher costs, TC3, than the firm at
point C whose costs are TCI. This differential may be decomposed
into: (1) the cost of technical inefficiency, TC3-TC2, which is due to
low factor productivity relative to firms at point B on the efficient
isoquant employing the same capital-labor ratio; and (2) the cost of
allocative inefficiency, TC2-TC1, which is due to the choice of the
wrong technique at existing relative factor prices. Thus, improve-
ments in static efficiency are measured by a move from point A to
point C.
On the other hand, improvements in dynamic productivity or
technological progress are observed when the "best practice" pro-
duction function (i.e., PP) shifts toward the origin. However, this
study only covers the concept of static efficiency (allocative and
technical efficiency) gains.
To measure allocative efficiency, this study uses the concept of
the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC), which has been widely utilized
as an index of economic efficiency in restrictive trade regimes. The
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tunity cost of domestic resources used per unit of net foreign ex-
change earned (saved) by the export (import substitution) of a given
product (Bautista, Power and Associates 1979).
In the ex post sense, the DRC criterion can be related to the
effective protection rate (EPR), which is the percentage excess of
domestic value added at protected prices (made possible by protec-
tive measures such as tariffs, taxes and import restrictions in certain
cases) over the value added at free trade prices. Thus, the DRC can
be used to represent the social cost of promoting exports or of
protecting import-substituting industries under an existing trade re-
gime.
The DRC estimates are derived using shadow prices, that is,
social accounting prices. The rationale behind the use of shadow
prices in place ofmarket prices lies behind the assumption that market
prices, in the presence of distortions, do not reflect real costs of inputs
and the real benefits of outputs to society. Policy-induced distortions
exist in the Philippines as in many developing countries. DRCs using
market prices (DRCM) are also estimated to measure international
competitiveness but will be discussed later in this chapter.
Technical efficiency, on the other hand, is defined as the ability
of the firm to produce the maximum potential output on the produc-
tion frontier, given aspecified mix of inputs and technology (Hill and
Kalirajan 1991). The level of technical efficiency of firms can be
explained by firm-specific characteristics, such as entrepreneurial
experience, technological knowledge, and the age of the firm as atest
for the presence of learning-by-doing phenomenon (Page 1980). Due
to differences in these firm-specific factors, the level of technical
efficiency among firms varies,
The concept of efficiency performance within the economy can
also be portrayed through Figure 2, which shows the production
possibility frontier (PPF). PPF is a curve that shows the maximum
possible combinations of two goods, such as X and Y, that an
economy can produce by fully utilizing all of its resources with the
best technology available. Points on the frontier thus represent tech-
nically efficient, attainable combinations of X and Y. Points inside









because of underutilization and/or inefficient use of existing re-
sources. The movement from point A to point B would therefore
represent a gain in technical efficiency as the economy achieves
higher output levels with its current available resources. However, at
point B, a restrictive trade regime has made relative prices of both
goods to differ. That is, protection has made good Y more expensive
and likewise more profitable than X. This, in effect, would render
point B to be allocatively inefficient. Correcting the distortion in
relative output prices, by relaxing trade barriers, would induce a
movement from point A to point C on the frontier.
In general, a gain in technical efficiency (from point A to point
B) may be attributed only to non-price factors, while a gain in
allocative efficiency (from point B to point C) would call for price-
related changes.
Competitiveness
International competitiveness refers to the ability of firms and
industries to compete in the domestic market with importers and in
external markets with other exporters, including the domestic pro-
ducers in the destination market (Tecson 1992). One indicator of
international competitiveness is the DRC at market prices (DRCM).
In showing the relationship between the DRC at shadow prices
and at market prices, the DRC (at shadow prices) may be expressed
in another form:
DRCM DRCM SER DRC
_ • -- _ --
OER DRC OER SER
where:
OER = official exchange rate;
SER = shadow exchange rate;
DRCM/OER = competitive advantage;
DRCM/DRC = the distortions due to the domestic
tax system and wage structure;
SER/OER = the distortions due to currency
overvaluation, for instance; and
DRC/SER = comparative advantage.Agricultural Machinery Industry b, 15
Due to market distortions, a firm or an industry may achieve com-
petitive advantage position. Furthermore, a firm or an industry may
achieve comparative advantage but may not be competitive atall.
Market Structure Dimension
The traditional view is that certain dimensions ofmarket structure
condition the behavior of firms within that market, which in turn
determines the outcomes of the competitive process within that
market (Lee 1992). Two of the more commonly identified structure
variables have been seller concentration and entry barriers.
Traditionally, seller concentration ratio (SCR) refers to the num-
ber and size distribution of sellers in the market. Technically, SCR
refers to production concentration ratio if imports and exports are
ignored.
Another dimension of market structure are the barriers to entry
which traditionally refers to the degree of ease or difficulty with
which new firms may enter a market. Entry barrier also refers to
anything that allows incumbent firms to earn excess profits, that is,
keep prices above minimum average costs (Bain 1956). Barriers to
entry tend to limit the number of players in a particular sector, thereby
limiting competition, which would encourage dominant firms to earn
supranormal profits, as in the case of monopolistic or oligopolistic
market structures.
TRADE POLICY REFORM, PERFORMANCE,
COMPETITIVENESS AND MARKET STRUCTURE LINKAGE
The weak empirical evidence pertaining to the benefits of trade
liberalization on economic performance rests on the uncertainty with
which firms respond to the new set of incentives established by trade
policy changes (Kirkpatrick and Maharaj 1992). It is argued that the
behavior of firms is conditioned by the uncompetitive nature of the
domestic industrial sector. The "new theory" of intemational trade
which combines the concepts of industrial organization with trade16 4 Frances MyraC.Trabajo
theory, emphasizing on economies of scale and imperfect competi-
tion, leads to various possible outcomes depending on the assump-
tions made.
One of the most appealing arguments for trade liberalization is
the rationalization of industrial structure when exposed to the forces
of a more neutral trade policy. This possible outcome lies on the
premise that protection tends to attract a number of firms producing
at low levels of output, that is, way below the minimum efficient
scale. The advent oftrade liberalization will therefore lead to industry
rationalization by forcing inefficient producers out of the market. As
protection falls, market prices also fall, driving some players in the
industry-- the inefficient ones -- out of business; those who remain
must reduce their production cost, thereby resorting to innovative
activities in order to compete. However, Rodrik (1988) points out
that these effects, rooted on the industry-rationalization argument,
will only be plausible under assumptions of economies of scale and
free entry and exit.
In situations where entry and exit are easy, coupled with the
assumption that firms can rapidly adjust to the removal of protection,
domestic firms can expand their output to meet the increase in
demand following the reduction in domestic price (Kirkpatriek and
Maharaj 1992). However, in situations where entry and exit are
difficult, trade liberalization will now depend on the "import-disci-
pline" hypothesis which claims that increased foreign competition
(or the threat of potential entry) will reduce the market power of
domestic firms, thereby affecting their pricing and production deci-
sions. Hence, this has a direct bearing on technical efficiency im-
provements because domestic producers have to move to a lower cost
curve so as not to be displaced by imports and be coerced out of the
industry. In the context of imperfectly competitive markets, it was
observed by Tybout, de Melo and Corbo (1991) that heightened
exposure to foreign competition led to industrial rationalization, with
surviving firms operating at sub-optimal levels and moving closer
toward the "best practice" production frontier.
The theory of contestable markets also argue that in a market
where entry barrier is nonexistent (i.e., perfect contestability) andAgricultural Machinery Industry _ 17
even with the presence of high seller concentration, the incumbent
sellers will behave as they would in a competitive market condition
due to the threat of potential competition, whether external or internal
(Lee 1992). However, if entry barriers are high, the exercise of any
monopoly or oligopoly power, which is already prevailing within the
market, will be protected and preserved.
OTHER FACTORSAFFECTINGINDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE
The level of performance of afirm or industry does not only stem
from the impact of trade policies. Distinctive characteristics as well
as other non-price factors also define the behavior of a firm or
industry. One crucial factor is the demand conditions or constraints
which may restrict the attainment of scale economies. Demand
constraints may be illustrated by lack of market assurance which can
be ascribed to low purchasing power of buyers aggravated by capital
market imperfections. A credit system biased against small- and
medium-scale firms constrains the growth of these firms since it is
difficult for them to procure financial resources or access to credit.
As a result, these firms will be compelled to produce an output which
is less than the maximum potential level. On the other hand, firms
may experience the accumulation of excess capacity, that is, supply
would exceed demand in amarket that is characterized by adepressed
demand.
The industry's linkage with other sectors also affects its level of
performance. If the backward linkage of the industry is not well
developed, then the supply of sub-standard quality of locally-sourced
inputs could be more prevalent. Poor quality of local material inputs
leads to chronic capacity underutilization and manufacture of sub-





THIS chapter consists of two main sections. The first one identifies
the different sources of data, both primary and secondary. The second
section presents in detail the different measures and indicators used
•in the study.
DATA SOURCES
This study relies on data from the 1983 and 1988 Census of
Manufacturing Establishments (or plants) by the National Statistics
Office (NSO). Supplementary data was taken from a survey of
agricultural machinery firms in 1986 and 1991. The years 1983 and
1988 are the two reference points considered to represent the pre-
trade reform period and the transition towards the post-trade reform
period, respectively. The 1986 and 1991 survey data will likewise
provide addi_tionalinformation pertaining to trade reform conditions
since trade policy adjustments are still being aimed until 1995.
The use of both sources of data is not without limitations.
Changes at the establishment level cannot be examined using census
statistics because establishment code numbers (ECNs) vary every
census year. Thus, the ECNs in 1983 do not match with that in 1988.
With the finn-level survey data, the study tries to illustrate firm-level
characteristics. However, effective protection rate (EPR), domestic
resource cost (DRC), and other important measures to be analyzed at
the industry level cannot be obtained due to incomplete information.
Other sources of data are the Department of Agriculture-Intema-
tional Rice Research Institute (DA-IRRI) Industrial Extension Program,20 41 Frances MyraC.Trabajo
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Board of Investments
(BOI), Tariff Commission (TC), Agricultural Mechanization Develop-
ment Program (AMDP), National Economic and Development Author-




Effective protection rate (EPR)
The effective protection rate (EPR) is ameasure of the protection
given to incumbent firms and industries. It is defined as the,percent-
age excess of domestic value added at protected prices (V j), made
possible by protective measures such as tariffs, taxes, and import
regulations in certain cases, over the value added at free trade prices
(Vj), that is, without protection. The general formula of the EPR is
as follows:
zPR = (v_-vj_ _ v_ i
vj vj
where
V j = the value of production minus the total cost
of raw materials (both net of sales taxes); and
Vj = the value of production minus the total cost
of raw materials (both at border prices).
The above equation may be written as
Z VP9 Z A'ij
l+Sj I+$i
EPR = J l - 1
Z VPj Z Aij
I+Tj l+Ti 9AgriculturalMachineryIndustry I_ 21
where VPj = value of production of output j;
A'ij = cost of local raw material i per year;
Aij = cost of imported raw material i per year;
sj = domestic sales tax on output j;
si = domestic sales tax on raw material i;
Tj = implicit tariff rate on output j; and
Ti = implicit tariff rate on imported
raw material i.
Implicit tariff
Implicit tariff represents the proportional difference between
domestic prices and border prices of homogeneous goods (Bautista,
Power and Associates 1979). The difference is due to protective
measures such astariffs, taxes and import restrictions in certain cases.
The implicit tariffs for both output and input are computed by using
the following general formula:
T= [ (i + t) (i + s) ] - 1
where T = implicit tariff rate;
t = nominal tariff rate; and
s = sales tax.
Net effective protection rate (NEPR)
The above discussion on EPR indicates the relative incentives
given to different subsectors and industries (Tan 1979). It emphasizes
onthe relative position ofsubsectors in the EPR scale since protection
is a relative concept. However, as a whole, tradable goods can be
penalized relative to nontradables by an overvalued currency or can
be protected by an undervalued currency. Thus, to account for the
extent of currency overvaluation, the EPR is adjusted as follows:
ozR ( 1 + zPR )
NEPR = - 1
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where NEPR = the net effective protection rate;
OER = the official exchange rate; and
SER = the shadow exchange rate.
Measures of Efficiency
Domestic resource cost (DRC)
The Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) isa commonly used measure
to examine allocative efficiency and competitiveness of the domestic
industry in the international scene. As defined in Chapter 3, it is a
cost-benefit ratio representing the social opportunity cost of domestic
resources used per unit of net foreign exchange earned (saved) by the
export (import substitution) of a given product. In general, the
formula of the DRC for any output j is
Domestic Cost per Unit of j
DRCj =
World (Border) Price - Foreign Cost per Unit of j
where the numerator is expressed in pesos, while the denominator is
in dollars. World (border) price is expressed in free-on-board (f.o.b.)
terms for exports and cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f.) terms for imports.
For this study, the DRC estimates are computed using shadow
and market prices to assess comparative and competitive advantage
position, respectively, ofthe plant/subsector/industry. Both estimates
only differ in the numerator of the DRC equation because DRC at
market prices used actual prices. That is, the components of the
numerator in the computation of DRC based on market prices are not
deflated by sales taxes. Moreover, the cost of unskilled labor is not
converted into its shadow cost. The following discussion on the DRC
procedure is based on the use of shadow prices.
There are five major cost components of the DRC, and these are:
(1) capital cost (depreciation and interest costs); (2) land cost (for the
firm-level survey only); (3) labor cost; (4) cost of raw materials and
supplies; and (5) other domestic costs.Agricultural Machinery Industry _, 23
Capital cost
Capital cost consists of depreciation and interest costs of capital
assets, which are classified as: (1) buildings and structures; (2)
production machinery and equipment; (3) transport equipment; (4)
other fixed assets (e.g., office equipment and fixttu'es); and (5)
inventories. The steps in obtaining depreciation and interest costs of
these assets are outlined below.
Replacement cost of capitaL Except for inventories, the replace-
ment costs (the present costs of replacing the fixed assets) of capital
assets are derived by inflating their acquisition costs by the appropri-
ate price indices. Construction price index (CPI) is applicable for
buildings and structures, while machinery and transport index (MTI)
is for machinery and transport equipment and other fixed assets. The
values obtained are further deflated b_,acompounded annual produc-
tivity growth rate of three percent to get their replacement costs. The
price index inflator adjusts for inflation in the capital asset, while the
productivity deflator takes into account the offsetting increase in the





AC = the acquisition cost;
pr = the ratio of the price indices of the
current year and the year the fixed
asset was acquired; and
t =- the age of the fixed asset.
AC is derived by the equation
ACk = nk * dk24 4 FrancesMyraC.Trabajo
where
n = the fixed asset's economic life: (a) 50 years
for buildings and structures; (b) 23 years for
•machinery and equipment (used in the
manufacture of agricultural machinery);
(c) 15 years for transport equipment; and
(d) 20 years for other fixed assets; and
d = the asset's annual depreciation cost.
Depreciation cost offixed assets. Depreciation must reflect the
actual life of the fixed asset as well as inflation and productivity
increases over time. Thus:
RCg
DCkj "_
nk * i. 5
)
where
1.5 = the factor used to reflect the extended
years the capital fixed asset is being
utilized.
It is a well-kno_vn fact in most developing countries that the actual
life of a capital asset extends beyond the useful/standard life and
therefore, it is assumed that the actual life is 50 percent longer than
the reported standard life.
After estimating the depreciation cost of the fixed asset, it is then
allocated into its domestic and foreign components. The allocation
ratios are:
Fixed Asset Domestic Foreign
% %
(1) Buildings and structures 100 0
(2) Machinery and equipment 0 100
(3) T_'ansport equipment 20 80
(4) Other fixed assets 15 85Agricultural MachineryIndustry I_ 25




Ykd = the domestic share of asset K, and
s = the sales tax.
The foreign depreciation cost, therefore, is:
DCkj (I - Yko)
DCkfj =
OER (I + Tk)
where
OER = the official exchange rate;
Tk = the implicit tariff appropriate for
asset K; and
(1+Tk) = the deflator needed to convert foreign
depreciation cost of asset K to peso
border price.
Interest cost on fixed assets. Interest cost on fixed assets is
obtained by multiplying the replacement cost of asset K to the r (rate
of return), which is assumed to be the social rate of return in
manufacturing for the year (12 percent for 1983 and 10 percent for
the rest of the years under study, that is, 1986 onwards). The shadow
interest rate in 1983 is higher than in 1986 onwards because it is
assumed that capital was more scarce in 1983 than in 1986 onwards,
when the Philippine economy started to recover from the balance-of-
payment crisis in the latter period of 1983-84. Thus, the equation
employed is
Ik3 = r * RCk26 _ Frances MyraC.Trabajo
The total interest cost above is then allocated into its domestic
and foreign components. The ratios used for allocation are:
Fixed Asset Domestic Foreign.
% %
(1) Buildings and structures 85 15
(2) Machinery and equipment 85 15
(3) Transport equipment 85 15
(4) Other fixed assets 100 0





Ykd = the domestic component.
The foreign interest cost, adjusted to border prices, therefore, is:
Ikfj = !kj (1 - ykd) OZR (1 + Zk)
where
(1 - Ykd) = the foreign component.
Interest cost on inventory or working capital. In the case of
inventories, an average inventory level for the period is first com-
puted based on a simple average of beginning and ending inventory
of finished goods, work-in-process, and raw materials and supplies
and other stocks.
The shadow interest rate, r, is then applied to the total average
inventory to obtain the total interest cost on inventory, which is then
broken down into its domestic and foreign components.Agricultural Machinery Industry b, 27
Land cost or rent
Computation for the interest cost on land is applicable only when
using the survey data. The land on which the plant is situated is either
owned, leased, or rented. The opportunity cost of land, if owned, is
the imputed rent obtained by applying the shadow interest rate, r, to
the estimated current value of land. The current value of land may be
provided by the firm or may be computed by inflating the original
acquisition cost of land from the year it was purchased to the current
year desired. The inflator used is CPI since rent/housing is one
component in constructing the CPI and is assumed to approximate
the price increase of land. Thus, the equation used is the following:
Ldj = ACL * r
The rental to land is considered entirely domestic.
Labor cost
Labor cost covers basic salaries and wages and overtime pay.
Contributions to government or private insurance institutions and
other benefits are not included.
The shadow wage rate for skilled workers is assumed to reflect
actual earnings or true marginal productivities, while that of the
unskilled workers is assumed to be 70 percent of the market wage.
Hence, the social cost of labor is
SWtJ = SWu + SWv
where
SWu = the shadow wage rate for unskilled workers
SWv = the shadow wage rate for skilled workers
Raw materials and supplies
Raw materials include the major and minor inputs used in pro-
duetion. Supplies include office supplies, fuels, lubricants, electric-
ity, and water. The following are the allocation ratios:28 _ Frances MyraC.Trabajo
Items Domestic Foreign
% %
(1) Major and minor raw materials 70 30
(2) Office supplies 15 85
(3) Fuels and lubricants 0 100
(4) Electricity and water 100 0
The domestic cost for raw materials and supplies (RM) is divided
into two equal components as follows:
((mR, * _'Rd)05) _s_.R_ (P_Rj * _'Rd)0 5 = 1+Ti * 1 . s,
where
RMRj stands forthe reported cost of raw materials and
supplies R.
The foreign cost is adjusted as follows:
RMRj(1 - Zsa)
Rbtf j =
OER (I + Ti)
Other domestic cost
Based on data from the census, other domestic costs (ODCj)
include costs incurred to industrial and non-industrial services done
by others. Subsidies received are also considered. Based on the
survey data, other domestic costs also include rental payments. The





ODCa = the actual cost accrued to other domestic costs.Agricultural MachineryIndustry _ 29
Border value of production
The border value of production of product j (BVPj) is simply the
deflated value of output of product j (VPj). Thus:
vPj
BVPj =
OER ( 1 + Tj)
After doing all the necessary adjustments, the general form of the
DRC used in the study is
DCkdj + Ikdj + RMdj + Ldj + SWaj + ODCj
DRCj =
BVPs - (Dkf j + SSfj)
where
Domestic Cost
DCkdj = domestic depreciation cost;
Ikdj = domestic interest cost;
RMdj -- cost of local raw materials
and supplies;
Ldj = land cost;
SWtj -- domestic labor cost;
ODCj = other domestic cost;
Foreign Cost
DCkfj = foreign depreciation cost;
Ik0 = foreign interest cost;
R_fj = cost of imported raw materials
and supplies; and
BVPj = border value of production.
The DRC is then compared with the SER to measure allocative
efficiency and comparative advantage or social profitability at the
firm, subsector, and industry level. The lower the DRC/SER value,
the more efficient is the use of domestic resources in the production
of an import-substitute or export good, and vice-versa. The conven-30 < Frances MyraC.Trabajo
tional definition of DRC/SER value which indicates allocative effi-
ciency and comparative advantage falls between 0 and 1, however,
this "studymakes an allowance of 0.2 to account for marginal errors.
Firms with a DRC/SER ratio greater than 0 but less than or equal to
1.2 are considered efficient or low cost users of foreign exchange.
Those with ratios greater than 1.2 but do not exceed the ratio of 1.5
are considered moderately inefficient. Otherwise, they are considered
inefficient (i.e., greater than the ratio of 1.5) orhigh cost users. Lastly,
those with negative values are considered dissavers of net foreign
exchange since their foreign costs exceed the border value of their
output.
In the ease of DRC estimates at market prices, the DRCM is
compared with the OER to measure competitive advantage orprivate
profitability. The definition for DRCM/OER value follows that of the
above.
Technical efficiency
Another indicator of performance is technical efficiency, defined
as the firm's ability to maximize potential output from a specified
mix of inputs and technology (Hill and Kalirajan 1991). To estimate
potential output and thereby obtain the technical efficiency index of
the industry, the deterministic programming method applied in this
study is derived from Nishimizu and Page (1982) and Page (1984).
Both studies specified atranslog production frontier, and the estima-
tiop procedure adopted was an application of linear programming.
The linear programming technique for estimating technical effi-
ciency represents the deviation from the frontier as an optimization
problem. The technique used minimizes the deviation of the actual
from the maximum potential production function, subject to anumber
of constraints. Thus:
Min Ye - Y,
where
Ye = aO + eL in L + _K in K + f_M in M
+ _LK in L in K + _LM in L in M + _KM in K in M
z z. _)2 z _2 + _ aLL (in L)2 + _ aKg (in + _aMM (inAgricultural Machinery Industry I_ 31
subject to the following constraints:
(i) CtL + Ctr + CtM ----1
(ii) (ILK + _LM + tILL = 0
(X KL + ft IgM + (_ KK = 0
(_ ML + (X MI( + (X I_I = 0
(iii) rILL < 0
C_ rK _ 0
_ _ 0
where
Ye = estimated maximum potential output;
Y = value of actual output;
L = total number of man-hours;
K' = user cost of capital; and
M = cost of raw materials.
The results of the minimization problem presented above will
describe the frontier production function or "best practice" frontier
of the industry.
Technical efficiency can be presented in the following way:
Y
Technica L Efficiency = y-_
The above ratio is called the technical efficiency coefficient (TEC).
It denotes the extent to which a plant is able to achieve the maximum
potential output given its choice of technique. The two subsectors in
the subject industry used the same production technology and as such,
they are lumped together to obtain the average TEC.
A plant or an industry is said to be technically efficient if its
technical efficiency coefficient (TEC) is not less than 75 percent (Hill
and Kalirajan 1991).32 _ FrancesMyraC.Trabajo
Import Penetration Ratio
The import penetration ratio (IPR) is employed to examine the
extent of the industry's exposure to import competition. It indicates
the proportion of importsto total domestic sales, which is the value
of output minus exports and plus imports. In equation form
Imports
IPR =
Domestic Sales - Exports + Imports
Market Structure and Profitability Indicators
For this study, two measures of concentration are employed: (1)
the 4-plant concentration ratio (CR4), which measures the share of
revenue in terms ofmajor products and census value added accounted
for by the four largest plants in the subsector/industry; and (2) the
Herfindahl index (HI), which measures the dispersion in plant sizes
within industry i, is the sum of the squared plant market shares in
industry i. In equation form:
_- y, s ,j
where j = 1 ... n plants in industry i
An industry or subsector is said to be highly concentrated ifCR4
is above 60 percent. It is also highly concentrated if HI ismuch higher
than the ratio 1over the total number of plants (i.e., I/n) and close to
1.
For profitability assessment, price-cost margin is utilized. The
price-cost margin is derived by dividing the difference between
census value added and compensation over the value of output. It
may be written in the following form:
Census Value Added - Compensation
PCM =
Value of OutputAgricultural Machinery Industry _ 33
The higher the estimated PCM, the higher the market power exercised
by a subsector or industry.
Factor Productivity and Intensity
Capital productivity, labor productivity and capital-labor (K/L)
ratio or capital intensity are computed by following these formulas:
Capital Productivity = Census Value Added




Capital Intensity = Capital Stock at Replacement Cost
Number of Workers
Census value added is changed into constant 1972 prices using
the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator for the manufacturing
sector. Replacement cost of capital, obtained from the DRC calcula-
tions, is adjusted using the deflator for capital goods.5
Industry Background
This chapter provides a factual background of the agricultural
machinery industry in the Philippines. It presents the general profile
of the industry and examines the government policies affecting it.
The changes in the level of protection brought about by the shift in
trade policy orientation arealso presented in this chapter.
GENERALPROFILE
Product Description
Agricultural machinery is ageneral term used to describe tractors,
combines, implements, machines, and any other device more sophis-
ticated than a hand tool, which are animal or mechanically powered
(Handbook on Agricultural Mechanization in the Philippines 1988).
This paper focuses on the manufacture of power-driven agricul-
tural machinery, particularly hand tractors (or power tillers), and
power threshers. Basic versions of the hand tractors are identified as
traditional and hydrotiller; while the power threshers are basically
known as axial-flow and portable. Based on the data obtained from
the Department of Agriculture-International Rice Research Institute
(DA-IRRI) Industrial Extension Program, hand tractors constitute
48.26 percent share of the reported production of the industry over
the period 1975-1992, followed by power threshers, which covered
























Note: Some cooperators of the program did not report their production statistics.
The number of active cooperators also varies every year,
Source: Department of Agriculture - International Rice Research Institute (DA-IRRI) Program
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Brief History
Domestic production of hand tractors was started in 1967 by the
Machinery Industries Company, Incorporated of Naga City in the
Bicol area. The company's brand name was popularly called Magico
which has been one of the main sources of machine designs in the
country until now. However, the rapid growth of local manufacture
only took shape in the early 1970s when IRRI released its first
low-cost designs of hand tractor and power thresher. The popularity
of the latter, however, did not gain a foothold until after 1975. Since
these machines were also designed to suit local physical conditions
and farming practices, they were well accepted by farmers. With
IRRJ's industrial extension services, the early 1970s marked the shift
from large imported machines to small, low-cost and locally pro-
duced machines to the use of mechanization technology in farm
operations.
Aside from the manufacture of IRRI-designed machines (espe-
cially hand tractors), there were other important factors influencing
the rapid growth of the industry in the first half of the 1970s,
particularly the period from 1972 to 1975 (Handbook onAgdettltural
Mechanization in the Philippines 1988). These factors were: (a) the
implementation of the Land Reform Program which resulted in large
income gains to farmer share tenants; (b) the outbreak of hoof and
mouth disease which afflicted 14,000 work animals in 1975; (c) the
availability.of financing programs for local!y-built farm 0aachines;
and (d) the promulgation of the General Order 47 in 1974.
Size and Plant Distribution
The agricultural machinery industry is composed of a combina-
tion of a few large- and medium-scale establishments and numerous
small-scale ones. A number of these small-scale manufacturers
started as operators of welding shops and were predominantly fam-
ily-owned and -managed. Almost all establishments in the industry
are producing more than one product line.38 4 FrancesMyraC.Trabajo
Table 2 shows the number of establishments in the industry based
on the 1978, 1983, and 1988 census data. In 1983, the hand tractor
manufacturers dropped to 5 from the 1978 figure of 18, registering a
72.22 percent decrease. One plausible reason for the substantial drop
in the number of establishments was the stiff competition with
micro-scale or "backyard" operators, who only operate when there
is a demand for certain farm machinery and equipment, in a dimin-
ishing market. These operators are based in the rural areas where the
large local market is, thereby making them very accessible to end-
users. Proximity to potential users do not only facilitate physical
selling of agricultural machines but also make interaction with farm-
ers regarding machine improvements and modifications possible.
The proliferation of these backyard operators was primarily triggered
by the launching ofthe DA-IRRI Program in 1980. Another plausible
reason was the unstable political as well as economic climate in 1983
which badly affected the industry. However, one establishment had
entered the market between 1983 and 1988.
In the manufacture of power thresher, there were only 14 estab-
lishments in 1978 which escalated to 25 in 1983, but slightly declined
to 24 in 1988. This can be ascribed to the farmers' increasing
awareness of the benefits of post-harvest technologies.
Over the 1978-1988 period, the number of hand tractor estab-
lishments decreased by 67 percent, while that of the power thresher
establishments increased by 71 percent. At the aggregate level, a
decline of six percent was experienced during the period under study.
The census data also revealed that only 27 percent of the manu-
facturing establishments in 1983 were located in the National Capital
Region (NCR), while the bulk of these were strategically dispersed
in other parts of the country (Table 3). In 1988, the number of
establishments in the NCR increased by a negligible three percent.
Input Structure
The raw material needs of the industry are mainly metallurgical.
Steel matei'ials (e.g., B.I. sheets, pipes, steel bars, and plates) account
for 70 to 90 percent of the total weight of power-driven macl:_a_:ryAgricultural MachineryIndustry p, 39
I I I Ill
Table2
Number ofEstablishments: 1978, 1983 and1988
1978 1983 1988
Hand Tractor 18 5 6
Power Thresher 14 25 24
Induslry 32 30 30
Source:CemusofEstab#shments, 1978, 1983 and 1988. National Statistics Ol_ce.
BBI I I
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Table 3
Geographical Plant Location: 1983andt988(Inpercent)
1983 1988
NCR ONCR NCR ONCR
Hand Tractor 40 60 17 83
Power Thresher 24 76 33 67
Industry 27 73 30 70
Notes: NCR- NationalCapitalRegion
.ONCR. Outside NationalCapitalRegion
Source: Censusof Estab//shments, 1983and1988,National _ Office.
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(Manaligod 1988). At present, the raw materials being imported
include: engines, bearings, chains, gear boxes, sprockets, perforated
sheets, and cold roll steel. On one hand, the other raw materials are
already being supplied by local mills. Since engines are wholly
imported and therefore costly, they constitute approximately 60
percent of the total cost of the machine package. An engine can be
suited easily to the user's needs and design because it is not yet
installed on the machine. As such, users have a choice as regards the
type of engine they prefer which they can also easily attach to other
farm machinery.
in 1982, however, Delta Motors Corporation (DMC) ventured
into producing a single-cylinder CX-engine of 10 horsepower
(AMDP 1990). But two years later, it stopped operation due to heavy
indebtedness and worsening economic situation. The company was
able to sell atotal of 1,009 units at an average cost of P3,423.00 per
unit, which was P1,565.00 lower than the imported Briggs and
Stratton engine of the same capacity. Performance test report of the
Agricultural Machinery Testing and Evaluation Center (AMTEC)
revealed that the local engine was of good quality. Table 4 shows the
sales volume of engines and selected agricultural machines from
1966 to 1991.
Machine Design and Product Quality
Most agricultural machine designs have been tailored from
IRRI's research and development efforts since the early 1970s. Free
blueprints are being provided by IRRI to interested individuals for
commercial production and marketing. Since the Institute does not
issue exclusive fabrication rights to a single manufacturer, majority
of the manufacturers in the industry therefore are engaged in innova-
tive and product-improving technological change activities (Mikkel-
sen 1984).
Quality and performance standards are being formulated by the
Technical Committee No. 19 (see Appendix 1 for description) and
AMTEC. Test procedures and evaluation of after-sales capabilities
of local producers are also conducted to ensure users of quality sparer-
Table 4 E




Year Gasoline Diesel Total Growth Gasoline Diesel Total Gro_ Growth




1967 ...... 3,058 58.28 '_'
1968 -- -- -- ' -- -- -- 1,873 (38.75)
1969 ...... 910 (51.41)
1970 ...... 425 (53.30)
1971 ...... 680 60.00
1972 ...... 1,408 107.06
1973 ...... 3,120 121.59
1974 ...... 6,721 115.42
1975 44,284 2,330 46,614 -- -- -- 11,077 64.81
1976 25,962 2,995 29,957 (35.73) -- -- 8,937 (19.32)
1977 27,124 4,053 31,177 4.07 -- -- 9,209 3.04





Year Gasoline Diesel Total Growth Gasoline Dieset Total Growth Growth
Rate_o) Rate(%) Rate(%)
1979 41,471 5,g17 47,388 16.93 4,287 t,092 5,379 (31.06) 3,006 35.41
1980 26,666 6,646 33,312 (29.70) 2,070 923 2,993 (44.36) 2,401 (20.13)
1981 26,203 9,528 35,731 7.26 1,696 1,205 2,901 (3.07) 1,137 (52.64)
1982 26,552 7,695 28,247 (20.95) 1,643 514 2,157 (25.65) 391 (65.61)
1983 18,773 5,927 24,700 (12.56) 1,066 569 1,635 (24.20) 335 (14.32)
1984 4,997 2,370 7,367 (70.17) 947 286 1,233 (24.59) 487 45.37
1985 6,974 2,647 9,621 30.60 99 727 826 (33.01) 653 34.09
1986 7,660 2,570 10,230• 6.33 -- -- 313 (62.11) 247 (62.17)
1987 14,538 3,269 17,807 74.07 16 167 185 (40.89) 142 (42.51)
"33
1988 16,164 3,531 19,715 10.71 224 715 939 407.57 245 72.54
-1
1989 32,799 6,385 39,184 98.75 199 930 1,129 20.23 275 12.24 o
('D
1990 50,368 11,555 61,923 58.03 __ __ I,677 46.54 281 2.18 '-_
1991 29,851 9,467 39,318 (36.51) -- -- 957 (42.93) 300 6.76 "<
o
Note: '---' meansdatanotindicated.
Source: Agricu_ral MachineryManufacturers andDisbibutors Ass0da_on (AMMDA).
o-
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parts. Other private and public supporting agencies, with correspond-
ing details, are listed in Appendix 1.
Production Technology
The industry is characterized by apredominantly labor-intensive
production technology. The most common production facilities used
are the bar cutter, sheet cutter, power saw, drill press, grinder, sheet
bender, arc weld, oxy-acetylene, lathe machine, shaper, and air
compressor. The manufacturing process basically involves cutting,
grinding, drilling, machining, sub-assembling, and finishing. Ac-
cording to industry experts, however, there is need to upgrade quality
and introduce low cost and better production techniques.
As aresult of financial constraints on both sides --manufacturers
and users -- large investment on capital assets (i.e., purchase of
sophisticated fabrication machinery and equipment) is not viable for
the majority of the firms which are small-scale.
Industry Concerns
One of the main concerns facing the industry is the poor quality
of the local steel materials which can be traced to the absence of a
truly integrated steel mill complex and lack of forging and foundry
facilities in the country (AMDP 1990). According to Manaligod
(1988), the metallurgical properties of local steel materials do not
follow the standard softness and hardness required for the specified
metal classification. This problem in effect translates to time-con-
suming and costly fabrication process. Another problem is the high
cost of raw materials, especially those imported materials and com-
ponents which are subjected to high tariff rates. The need to upgrade
the present production technology is also a main concern of the
industry. Since its introduction in the early 1970s by IRRI, major
changes have not been made in the fabrication technology. Moreover,
low demand for agricultural machinery and equipment is another
problem which may be due to the following reasons: (a) low eco-
nomic viability of farmers brought about by high cost of some44 4- Frances MyraC.Trabajo
agriculture inputs; (b) inadequate financing and credit; and (c) unfa-
vorable natural calamities such as droughts, typhoons, floods, and
pests (Resurreccion 1991).
POLICY ENVIRONMENT
The Issue of Agricultural Mechanization
Agricultural machinery and equipment could increase farm out-
put and income. Timeliness of farm operations allows farmers to take
advantage of high-yielding varieties (HYVs) and accommodates
higher cropping intensities. As akey input to agricultural production,
the industry derives its demand from the agriculture sector. The
country's agricultural policies (e.g., agricultural mechanization and
irrigation development programs), therefore, influence the perform-
ance of the industry,
In the Philippi nes, agricultural mechanization is generally limited
to land preparation and threshing activities (see Appendix 2). The
former mainly uses hand tractors for small land holdings and four-
wheel tractors for large farm estates, while the latter uses power
threshers. On the average, the power input in the country is only 0.53
horsepower per ha.
Until now, the absence of a more rational mechanization policy
in the Philippines is largely attributed to the labor displacement issue
which is commonly laced by any labor-abundant economy. Nonethe-
less, the country's National Development Plans for the past several
years have encouraged the use of appropriate technology in the farm
production process.
In line with the government's thrust for the Philippines to reach
the status of a Newly Industrialized Country (NIC) in 1998, Senate
Bill 1103 --an act known as the Philippine Agricultural Mechani-
zation Program (PAMP) Act -- is currently being deliberated in the
Senate. This act calls for the institution of a "more comprehensive
and realistic agricultural mechanization program" in the country.Agricultural Machinery Industry b" 45
Financial Incentives
To finance the acquisition of agricultural machinery and equip-
ment (both local and imported), the Central Bank (CB) made an
agreement with the World Bank's International Bank forReconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD) on 2 November 1965 to set up a
financing program that would be channeled through rural banks. This
program was known as the CB-IBRD Credit Program. Four credit
lines, amounting to US$76 million (an average of P35.2 million
annually), were provided from 1965 to 1980 to interested farmers
(see Appendix 3). It was only in the fourth credit line that local
manufacturers were given considerable attention. Also, in response
to the provision of the fourth credit line and with the proliferation of
local manufacturers, the Agricultural Machinery Testing and Evalu-
ation Center (AMTEC) was established. The need to put up a testing
center was imperative to protect farmers from "fly-by-night" manu-
facturers that produced sub-quality products_
Industry sources claimed that the CB-IBRD Credit Program,
considered then as the main institutional credit support system for the
purchase of agricultural machines, largely contributed to the growth
of the industry until it was exhausted in 1980. Although banks were
required under P.D. 717 during the Marcos regime to reserve 25
percent of their loan portfolios for agricultural lending, this project
did not work at all forthe farmers' benefit, asdisclosed by .anindustry
source (Agri.Scope 1987). The reason was that the loan requirements
of the banks were often too stringent for the farmers. Moreover, the
farmers could not afford to borrow under the lending programs that
were offered by the banks.
With the outbreak of the hoof and mouth disease that plagued the
working animal condition in 1975, the Power Tiller Rationalization
Program was implemented. Aside from CB-IBRD loans, Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP), Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) and Philippine National Bank (PNB) were mobilized by the
government to allocate more funds for the acquisition of agricultural
machinery. LBP financed around 2,500 hand tractors, while DBP
financed 600 four-wheel tractors.46 4 FrancesMyraC.Trabajo
Until now, LBP has remained an institutional credit support
system. Recently, in 1992, DA launched a development tie-up with
LBP to finance agricultural mechanization activities in the country-
side. This project or financing scheme is known as the Agricultural
Mechanization Financing Program for Farmers' Cooperatives, where
an amount of P500 million is available for credit. One of the pro-
gram's areas of concern is the acquisition of agricultural machines.
However, loans are addressed only to existing cooperatives. This is
in line with the government's thrust to encourage the development
of cooperatives in the rural areas.
To date, Senate Bill 1103 currently being deliberated upon in the
Senate has included credit assistance as one of its main sections.
Banking institutions such as the ACPC (Agricultural Credit Policy
Council), LBP, and DBP to mention a few, are mandated to come up
with credit assistance packages for those farmers, other beneficiaries
and entrepreneurs willing to undertake agricultural mechanization
projects. Indeed, pursuing and realizing this program would mean a
brighter future for the agricultural machinery industry.
Investment Incentives
In 1967, the Investment Priorities Plan (IPP) was created by the
Board of Investments (BOI) to encourage local manufacturing indus-
tries. Considered as one of the priority projects then, the industry was
given a set of incentives, mostly in the form of tax deductions, as
provided for in the Investment Incentives Act (R.A. 5186). Machines
that are still under BOI listing are hand tractor, power thresher, corn
sheller, and other post-harvest equipment. Some poultry equipment
are also included.
Tariff Reform Program
The importation of agricultural machinery and equipment has
never been subjected to quantitative restriction (QR) measures as
long as compliance is made on the foreign exchange requirements ofAgricultural Machinery Industry _ 47
the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines. The local industry, how-
ever, is protected through tariffs.
In 1974, the Tariffand Customs Code of the Philippines reflected
a bias against locally manufactured agricultural machinery and
equipment. Imported agricultural machinery was subjected to ad
valorem (CIF) duty rates of 10to 30 percent, while the duty rates for
material inputs were very high; for instance, for steel it was 50
percent. Prime movers (i.e., single cylinder engines with 25 horse-
power and below) were subjected to a 10 percent duty rate. In
addition, an advance sales tax of 10 percent was also imposed.
In 1981, the first Tariff Reform Program (TRP) was launched
under Executive Orders (E.O.s) 609 and 632-A. TRP gradually
lowered and rationalized the country' sprotection structure in aperiod
of five years which ended in 1985.
E.O. 632-A in 1 January 1981 increased the level of nominal
protection for harvesting and threshing machinery (Table 5). In
addition, the tariff rates of some of the industry's major inputs, such
as engine and transmission assembly parts, also increased. Such a
stance was proposed to protect these particular subsectors especially
the pioneer engine manufacturing activity.
E.O. 632-A was then incorporated in the 1982 Tariff and Custom
Codes. The duty rate of hand tractor was reduced by some 10percent.
Tariff rates on inputs were also lowered. Note that the average tariff
rate on the industry's inputs was 30 percent at the start of the TRP,
and was reduced to 26 percent in 1983 until 1988.
In 23 January 1990, the National Emergency Memorandum
Order No. 8 (NEMO 8) cut down the duty rates for agricultural
machinery. The duty rate Was pegged at 10 percent for hand tractor
and its parts. In addition, the duty rate forengines with 25 horsepower
and below was eliminated, that is, from 20 percent to zero percent.
Through E.O. 404, the rates of import duty, as modified by NEMO
8, were extended. An attempt was made to return the concerned tariff
rates to their previous rates via E.O. 413, but due to a strong lobbying
from the private sector, the drastic policy change was not carried out.
NEMO 8 was instead maintained in E.O. 470, another major tariff





1978 1981 1983 1986 1991 1992 1993 1994
A. Output
1.Hand tractor 30 20 20 20 10 10 10 10
2.Power thresher 10 10 10 30 20 20 20 20
B. Inputs
1.B.I.sheets 50 40 30 30 25 25 20 15
2.B.I.pipes 50 40 40 30 30 30 30 30
3.Steel bars (angle, fiataridround) 30 20 20 20 10 10 10 10
4.M.S. plates 50 40 30 30 25 25 20 15
"r'l
5.Castiron 10 5 5 10 3 3 3 3 "-.z
C)
6.Welding rods 50 40 30 30 30 30 30 30 r,
7.Ball bearings 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
8.Roller chains 20 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
O






( d) '- Table5 continue _.
C
t978 t981 1983 1986 1991 1992 1993 1994 _--
Do
10.8oJts, nuts, screws, cotter-pins, 50 40 30 30 30 30 30 30 5
washers
11.Transmission shafts, cranks, clutches, 10 10 10 20 10 10 10 10 5"
EZ.
,L--
bearing housings, gear boxes, pulleys
12.Sprockets 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 ,._
13.Oilseals 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
14.Paints and1_inners 100 70 40 40 40 30 30 30
15.Springs 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
16•Pneumatic tyres 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
17.Internal combustion engine
(Rated 25HPandbelow) 10 10 20 29 0 0 0 0
Simple average tariff rate 34 30 26 26 23 22 21 21




the 1991 Tariff and Customs Code, tariff rates for hand tractors and
power threshers were 10 and 20 percent, respectively. These tariff
rates for the industry's outputs will remain effective until 1995. For
inputs, tariff rates ranged from 0 to 40 percent in 1991, but the range
fall between 0 and 30 percent in 1992 will take effect until 1995.
Hence, the average tariff rate on the industry's inputs was 23 percent
at the start of the 1991 TRP and was slightly reduced to 22 percent
in 1992. The average tariff rate slightly decreased again to 21 percent
in 1993, which remain effective until 1995.
Effective and Net Effective Protection
A more relevant measure of protection accorded on the firm/sub-
sector/industry is the effective protection rate (EPR) which takes into
account the protection for both output and inputs.
Looking at Table 6, the hand tractor subsector received an EPR
of 19.04 percent in 1983, but its EPR went down to 15.96 percent in
1988. The reduction in the subsector's EPR is attributed to the
decrease in its implicit tariffs, Tj and Ti, in 1988 (Table 7). Though
the nominal tariff for hand tractor and the average nominal tariff for
its inputs have not changed at all, the decrease in implicit tariffs is




Effective and Net Effective Protection Rates: 1983 and 1988 (Inpercent)
1983 1988
EPR NetEPR EPR NetEPR
Hand tractor 19.04 -4.77 15.96 .7.23
Power thresher 5.66 -15.47 40.84 12.68
Industry 7.29 -14.17 37.95 10.36
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The power thresher subsector, onthe other hand, received an EPR
of 5.66 percent in 1983, but its EPR notably rose to 40.84 percent in
1988. The plausible reason for this movement is the increase in the
nominal tariff for power thresher (from 10 percent in 1983 to 30
percent in 1988), which in effect, increased its Tj. In addition, the
increase in its Tj is combined with the decrease in its Ti.
At the aggregate level, the EPR of both subsectors averaged at
37.95 percent in 1988 from its very low EPR in 1983 which was 7.29
percent.
Net EPRs, which include the adjustment for foreign exchange
overvaluation, were also estimated for 1983 and 1988. The results
are also presented in Table 6. It can be discerned that the hand tractor
subsector remained penalized even in 1988, as revealed by its nega-
tive net EPR. This result implies that the particular subsector would
actually receive negative protection if the currency overvaluation is
considered.
In the case of the power thresher subsector, a different scenario
is depicted. From a negative net EPR in 1983, it achieved a positive
net EPR in 1988. This shows that the power thresher subsector in
1988 is favored even with an overvalued foreign exchange currency.
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Table 7
Implicit Tariff Rates: 1983, 1986, 1988 and1991 (inpecent)
1983 1986 1988 1991
On output: Tj
Hand tractor 35.00 35.00 32.00 21.00
Power thresher 23.75 46.25 43.00 32.00
Oninputs: Ti 41.75 41.75 38.60 35.30
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In sum, the TRP has considerably rationalized the protection
structure of the agricultural machinery industry, but it is still distorted
since the the average implicit tariff of the industry's inputs is higher
than the implicit tariff of hand tractors between 1983 and 1988. The
figure is greater than those of both products in 1991 and even until
1995.6
Industrial Performance
THISchapter examines the performance of the agricultural machin-
ery industry during the pre-trade reform period and the transition
towards post-trade reform. It presents the growth, changes in the
industrial market structure, efficiency performance, and competitive-
ness of the industry. For the most part, the analysis is based on data
from the 1983 and 1988 Census of Manufacturing Establishments.
Additional information is taken from a finn-level survey of the
industry which covers the years 1986 and 1991. It is important to
emphasize at this point that industrial performance is not solely
influenced by trade policy decisions. Hence, the non-price factors
influencing efficiency are considered in the presentation and analysis
of results.
GROWTH
The growth indicators which are based on three census years
1978, 1983, and 1988 -- of each subsector andthe industry as awhole
are the following:.value of output, census value added, sales (except
for 1978), and employment size (Table 8). Other growth indicators
such as production, imports and exports are also presented in this
section.
Value of Output
At constant prices, the value of output of the industry amounted
to approximately P84 million, P13.3 million, and P15.4 million in




1978 1983 1988 1978 1983 1988 1978 1983 1988
Valueofoutput* 67,256,949 2,613,154 1,890,116 16,818,384 10,713,541 13,471,165 84,075,333 13,326,695 15,361,281
Census value 38,959,601 1,768,698 249,794 7,157,667 5,975,017 5,294,570 46,117,268 7,743,715 5,544,364
Added*
Sales* n.a. 2,929,899 2,367,774 n.a. 6,771,146 13,498,387 n.a. 9,701,045 15,866,161
Employment size 1,350 105 117 571 555 436 1,921 660 553
.... "11
,-,f
Notes: *Inc_nstant 1972 prices, o m n.a. =Iflforr_3on not available, u_
Source: Census ofEstablishments, 197_1983 and 1988. National Sta'dst_ Office. ,,<
--t
._.
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of output was marked during the 1978-1988 period. The hand tractor
subseetor showed a 97.2 percent decrease, while the power thresher
subsector declined by only about 19.9 percent. Between 1983 and
1988, however, the industry's value of output in real terms aug-
mented. This was mainly due to the contribution ofthepower thresher
subsector whose value of output in real terms increased by about
25.74 percent.
According to industry sources, the value of output recorded in the
census data does not exactly represent the actual size of the agricul-
tural machinery industry. This is primarily because the production
statistics of micro-scale or "backyard" operators are not captured in
the census. These operators crowd the industry and when lumped
together constitute a large portion of the industry's domestic market.
Census Value Added
At constant prices, the agricultural machinery industry registered
acensus value added of P46.1 million, P7.7 million and P5.5 million,
in 1978, 1983 and 1988, respectively, indicating an 88 percent
decrease over the 1978-1988 period. A large reduction in the census
value added was contributed by the hand tractor subsector which
exhibited a 99.4 percent fall in its performance. On the other hand,
the power thresher subsector went down by only 26 percent.
Examining the 1983-1988 performance, the reduction in the
, census value added of the hand tractor subseetor was far greater than
the reduction exhibited bythe power thresher subsector, that is, 85.88
and 11.39 percent, respectively.
Sales
Sales performance of the industry in real terms was P9.7 million
in 1983 and P15.9 million in 1988 indicating an increase of 63.6
percent. A negative sales performance of 19.2 percent was recorded
by the hand tractor subsector, while the power thresher subsector
marked a significant increase of 99.4 percent in its 1988 sales figure.56 ,d Frances Myra C. Trabajo
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Table9
Production StatisticsofSelected Agricultural Machineries: 1978.1992 (Inunits)
Hand Tractor Power Thresher
Year No.of Tradi. Hydro. Total Axial- Portable Total
Coope- tional tiller* Flow
rators
1978 20 795 -- 795 689 1,746 2,435
1979 21 1,337 m 1,337 1,850 2,290 4,140
1980 31 979 -- 979 1,059 1,218 2,277
1981 33 1,107 -- 1,107 1,417 1,275 2,692
1982 55 2,310 -- 2,310 1,689 1,113 2,802
1983 75 2,268 -- 2,268 1,162 1,129 2,291
1984 79 1,985 -- 1,985 1,571 515 2,086
1985 79 3,844 -- 3,844 1,314 310 " 1,624
1986 58 1,214 1,162 2,376 1,458 290 1,748
1987 46 1,386 1,418 2,804 793 186 979
1988 31 1,538 258 1,796 1,639 384 2,023
1989 34 2,809 193 3,002 2,211 253 2,464
1990 45 5,250 324 5,574 1,474 167 1,641,
1991 22 1,438 1,320 2,758 597 473 1,070
1992 52 2,054 1,438 3,492 1,295 598 1,893
Notes: * Hydrotiller wasintroduced inlate1985; datainclude existing designs offloating tiller.
'i' means datanotavailable,
Source: Department ofAgriculture- International RiceResearch Institute (DA-IRRI) Program.
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Employment Size
Concerning employment size, a general reduction over the 1978-
1988 period was also experienced in the industry. Between 1978 and
1988, employment size at the aggregate level decreased by 71.2
percent. A sharp negative growth rate of 91.3 percent was recorded
by the hand tractor subsector, while only 23.6 percent was registered
by the power thresher Subsector. However, the employment size of
the hand tractor subsector between 1983 and 1988 slightly increased,




Year Hand Tractor Power Thresher
Tradi- Hydro- Total Axial- Portable Total
tional tiller Flow
1978 ......
1979 68.18 -- 68.18 168.51 31.16 70.02
1980 (26.78) -- (26.78) (42.76) (46.81) (45.00)
1981 13.07 -- 13.07 33.81 4.68 18,23
1982 108.67 -- (108.67) 19.20 (12.71) 4.09
1983 (1.82) -- (1.82) (31.20) 1.44 (18.24)
1984 (12.48) -- (12.48) 35,20 (54,38) (8.95)
1985 93.65 -- 93.65 (16.36) (39.81) (22.15)
1986 (68.42) -- (38.19) 10. 96 (6.45) 7.64
1987 14.17 22.03 18.01 (45,61) (35.86) (43.99)
1988 10.97 (81.81) (35.95) 106.68 106.45 106.64
1989 82.64 (25.19) 67.15 34.90 (34.11) 21.80
1990 86.90 67,88 85.68 (33.33) (33.99) (33.40)
1991 (72.61) 307.41 (50.52) (59.50) 183.23 (34.80)
1992 42.84 8.94 26,61 116.92 26.43 76.92
Source:Table 9
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Production
Table 9 provides historical production statistics of hand tractors
and power threshers from 1978 to 1992, while Table 10 shows the
production growth rates. The production volume is based on the
annual report of the active cooperators of the DA-IRRI Industrial
Extension Program. As can be observed, the production growth rates
illustrate an erratic trend which is attributable to the irregular number
DA-IRRI cooperators who reported their production volume every
year.
Nonetheless, some inferences could be drawn from the produc-
tion data when there was a regular trend in the number of active
cooperators for a particular period. For instance, during the period58 _1 FrancesMyraC.Trabajo
1980-1981, an increase in the volume of production was exhibited
by the hand tractor and power thresher subsectors. This can be partly
attributed to lower tariffs on some of their imported inputs which was
made possible by the TRP in 1981. From 1983 to 1984, however,
production by both products declined, which was largely due to the
political and economic crises the country experienced during that
period. By 1985, hand tractor production expanded by 93.65 percent,
while the power thresher production expanded only in 1986 despite
the fact that there were less active cooperators in that year compared
to the previous year. Noteworthy, the same case applied to the hand
tractor subsector in 1988 where growth rate posted at 106.64 percent.
The 1990 production data in the hand tractor subsector may be
ascribed to the implementation ofNEMO 8 (which reduced the tariff
rates for the industry's outputs and inputs, particularly putting zero
tariff for imported engines with horsepower of 25 and below).
AMMDA claimed that they immediately felt the effect ofNEMO 8
when it was implemented in February 1990 (Greenfields 1990). Due
to the absence of locally-made engines, all engines used for farm
machinery and equipment are wholly imported, thus, making them
more expensive to acquire. As noted in the previous Chapter, the cost
of engine constitutes about 60 percent of the total cost of the machine
package.
According to AMMDA, from February to April of 1990, gasoline
engine sales jumped by 84 percent compared to sales in the same
period in the previous year (see Table 4 for AMMDA's Report on
Sales). Sales on diesel engines also escalated by as much as 129
percent.
Accompanying the increase in engine sales, AMMDA further
claimed that the sales of local and imported agricultural machines
also increased. Major machinery manuthcturers in the country, espe-
cially those in Bulacan, Iloilo and Cotabato, were not even able to
supply that year's market demand for hand tractors and power
threshers.Agricultural Machinery Industry _. 59
Imports
The degree of trade openness, particularly import competition,
exhibited in a certain industry can be measured by the import pene-
tration ratio (IPR). It indicates the proportion of imports to total
domestic demand, that is, total domestic sales. In the case of the
agricultural machinery industry in the country, an IPR of 0.52 was
registered in 1983, but it went down to 0.49 in 1988.
Import statistics of hand tractors and power threshers are pre-
sented in Table 11. The high volume of imports from 1978 to 1981
was largely attributed to the availability of credit through the CB-
IBRD Credit Program. This program offered a lower interest rate as
well as low transaction costs compared with other financing institu-
tions. In addition, farmers with as much as five has of land could avail
of the program. Demand for farm machinery in this period was
mainly triggered by the introduction of new high yielding dee varie-
ties (HYVs), new farming techniques or technologies, and improve-
ment of irrigation facilities.
Imports forpower threshers at_er 1978 aswell as for hand tractors
after 1981 seemed negligible. The major contributing factor which
put imports almost to a halt was the local machine's adaptability to
the country's farming environment. That is, local machines are
developed to suit domestic agricultural system and socio-economic
conditions. Another contributing factor was the overcrowding of
micro-scale manufacturers in the industry which is prevalent until
now. Since these manufacturers are based in the rural areas, they can
be very accessible to end-users who are mostly small- and medium-
scale farmers. Moreover, the bulky nature of the machines also serves
as a natural obstacle to importing, which in turn requires higher
freight expenses.
According to the most recent data on the industry, imports of
power-driven agricultural machinery only reflect sophisticated or
state-of-the-art machines now available. These machines, either new
or used units, are usually employed only in large farm estates.
Furthermore, these machines are equipped with more technically
advanced components and require more power intake. The major60 _ FrancesMyra C. Trabajo
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Table11
Import Statistics ofSelected Agricultural Machineries: 1978-1991
Hand Tractor Power Thresher
Year Unite Value (CIF$) Units Value(ClF$)
1978 3,684 1,866,843 1,035 7,975
1979 2,903 1,498,730 27 6,826
1980 678 413,050 3 1,208
1981 455 457,963 35 16,548,
1982 247 1,150,785 40 19,200
1983 259 144,004 32 14,530
1984 72 22,256 -- --
1985 207 46,660 30 12,900
1986 280 71,150 37 9,042
1987 344 103,240 -- --
1988 180 51,970 20 3,112
1989 186 73,980 91 18,049
1990 209 64,216 47 10,439
1991 291 107,851 2 445
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics, 1978 to1991, National Statistics Office,
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suppliers of these so-called "hi-tech" farm machines are Japan,
United States, United Kingdom, and West Germany.
Exports
The industry's products are mainly geared to the local market so
exports are very minimal (Table 12). Industry informants, however,
claimed that majority of exports were not traded on a commercial
basis but were sent asprototypes to other developing countries. These
countries were said to have similar physical conditions as the Philip-
pines for machine adaptability considerations. Exports were coursed
through international agencies like IRRI and UNDP's Regional
Network for Agricultural Machinery. It can be gleaned that the
country has export capabilities since locally fabricated machines are
used as models for other agriculture-based economies like Nigeria,
Chile, Papua New Guinea, and others.
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
Market Concentration
The study uses 4-plant concentration ratio (CR4) and Herfindahl
index to measure market concentration at the level of the subsector
and industry. It is important to note at this point that concentration
measures ignore the share of imports, thus, technically they relate
more to production concentration rather than to seller concentration.
A subsector or industry is considered highly concentrated ifCR4
is above 60 percent and the estimated Herfindahl index is greater than
1/n (where n represents the total number of plants) and is close to 1.
The CR4 means that the largest four plants account for more than 60
percent of the size of the subsector or industry while the Herfindahl
index signifies the degree of dispersion in the size of plants within
the subsector or industry. Thus, the former refers only to the perform-
ante of the four largest plants in the subsector or industry, while the
latter captures all plant sizes, thereby also evaluating the degree of62 4 FrancesMyraC. Trabajo
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Table12
Export Statistics ofSelected Agricultural Machineries: 1978.1991
Hand Tractor Power Thresher
Year Units Value(FOB $) Units Value (FOB $)
1978 -- -- 1 745
1979 307 5,423 1 2,055
1980 678 375,771 -- --
1981 27 42,750 38 65,312
1982 12 32,733 4 6,730
1983 2 5,940 11 17,371
1984 12 16,168 8 18,029
1985 8 20,920 52 69,919
1986 -- -- 67 108,929
1987 -- -- 25 33,952
1988 -- -- 66 75,932
1989 3 9,318 3 4,662
1990 -- _ 1 1,456
1991 -- -- 6 16,320
Source:Foreign Trade Sta_tics, 1978 _ 1991. National S_tisti_ Office.
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internal (domestic) competition. Both measures are in terms of
revenue and census value added.
Before discussing the results of the study's concentration indica-
tors, it is vital to mention that based on data from the 1983 and 1988
census, the industry was mainly composed of small-scale estab-
lishments (orplants) in terms of employment size. A small-scale plant
is comprised of 5 to 99 workers; medium-scale has 100 to 199
workers; and large-scale has greater than or equal to 200 workers. It
was only in 1983 when there was asole medium-scale plant recorded
in the industry, specifically in the power thresher subsector. No
establishment employing more than or equal to 200 workers was
listed in both 1983 and 1988. Thus, both subsectors in 1988 were
composed of small-scale establishments, all with similar product
design indicating a relatively fixed market price to end-users.
The degree of concentration in terms of the CR4 and the Herfin-
dahl index measures in the agricultural machinery industry lessened
between 1983 and 1988 (Table 13). At the subsector level, both
measures decreased. The hand tractor subsector appeared to be more
concentrated and less dispersed than the power thresher subsector.
This is probably due to the fact that there were only a few number of
plants in the manufacture of hand tractor compared with the other
activity. Nonetheless, the decline in market concentrations can be
attributed to increased internal competition due to the TRP. In the
case of the hand tractor subsector, a plausible reason for the decline
may be the entrance of another plant in 1988. For the other subsector,
it may be due to the exit of the medium-scale producer in 1988 (albeit
an increase in protection rate), leaving small ones to continue and vie
for a portion of the market share it had left behind.
Profitability
The price-cost margin approach is utilized to indicate relative
profitability. Thus, the price-cost margin is used to examine the
association between concentration and profitability, thereby deter-




1983 1988 % 1983 1988 % 1983 1988 %
Change Change Change
I/N 0.200 0.167 -16,50 0.400 0.420 5,00 0,033 0.033 0,00
Herfindahi Index-Revenue 0.389 0.255 -34.45 0.162 0.113 -30.25 0,114 0.087 -23,68
Heriindahl Index-CVA 0,440 0286 -35,00 0.153 0.113 -26_14 0_I I8 0,099 -16.10
4-PlantConcentralionRalJo-Revenue 0.982 0.652 -33.60 0.716 0,382 -46.65 0.601 0,325 -45.92
4-PlantConcentralJon Ratio-CVA 0.983 0.898 -8,72 0.695 0.578 -16.82 0.610 0,540 -11.55
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Moreover, it is also used to indicate the presence or gauge the height
of entry barriers.
There was a substantial drop in price-cost margins at'the level of
the subsector and industry (see Table 13). As can be observed, the
hand tractor manufacturing activity recorded more reduction in price-
cost margin as manifested by its negative value of 0.062 in 1988 from
its positive value of 0.450 in 1983. On the other hand, the power
thresher subseetor marked aprice-cost margin of 0.117 in 1988 from
0.258 in 1983, indicating a 54.65 percent loss in market power.
Barriers to Entry and Expansion
Based on the survey data, almost all firms revealed that they have
easily entered the market. This can be merited to the fact that majority
of these firms are into small-scale manufacturing venture. Cruz
(1991) cited that the popularity of small-scale manufacturing is due
to the following: entry in the industry is relatively open; it requires
low capital and high labor; and there is little economies of scale.
However, the survey also disclosed that the most prevalent bar-
Hers to expansion are: lack of access to financial resources; difficulty
ofteelmology acquisition; high interest cost demanded by banks; and
too many firms competing in an industry with a depressed demand.
As an industry characterized by demand conditions, local manufac-
turers do not find it feasible to increase their current level of output.
The majority of the end-users' lack of financial capability as well as
the low level of adoption of mechanized technologies in the country
are perceived as the foremost reasons why manufacturers are not
motivated to produce at the maximum potential output. Furthermore,
the industry's market orientation is only geared domestically, thereby
constraining the avenue for any excess production.
Recapitulation
Overall, there was a reduction in both concentration ratios and
price-cost margins for the agricultural machinery industry and its
subsectors between 1983 and 1988. Hence, parallel movements66 _ FrancesMyraC.Trabajo
between the two concentration ratios and the price-cost margins
could thus be observed. That is, a fall in concentration ratio was
accompanied by a fall in price-cost margin. The subsector (i.e., the
hand tractor subsector) which seemed to be more concentrated and
less dispersed had also shown a large decline in its price-cost margin
between 1983 and 1988. Moreover, low levels of price-cost margins
suggest less profitability, weak market power and low presence of
barriers to entry in the industry.
EFFICIENCY PERFORMANCE
Two measures namely, the domestic resource cost (DRC) and the
technical efficiency coefficient (TEC), are utilized to analyze the
efficiency performance of the agricultural machinery industry and its
subsectors. In particular, the DRC is used to evaluate allocative
efficiency and comparative advantage whereas the TEC represents
technical efficiency position of the industry. As pointed out by
Kirkpatrick et al. (1984), allocative efficiency measures the degree
to which the best combination of different factors is achieved, having
regard for their relative prices; while technical efficiency measures
the degree of economy in resource inputs used to produce a given
output. It is thus hypothesized in the study that the advent of trade
liberalization (i.e., TRP) will generally lead to improvements in
efficiency performance.
Allocative Efficiency and Comparative Advantage
The DRC is a widely used approach for measuring the cost of
production in terms of the domestic resources used relative to the net
gains in foreign exchange through export or import substitution. In
the expost sense, the DRC can be used to represent the social cost of
promoting exports or of protecting import-substituting industries
under an existing trade regime.AgriculturalMachineryIndustry i_ 67
Census of establishment data, 1983 and 1988
At DRC in shadow prices, the hand tractor subsector was socially
efficient in allocating its resources in 1988, thus indicating allocative
efficiency and comparative advantage (Table 14). This evidence was
supported by its DRC/SER value of 0.84 in 1988. The power thresher
subsector, on the other hand, seemed to be moderately inefficient in
social terms in 1988 with a DRC/SER value of 1.33. The industry as
a whole was moderately inefficient in 1988, that is, with a DRC/SER
ratio of 1.30. Results, however, reveal that there had been improve-
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Table14
Protection andEfficiencyLevels:1983 and1988
HandTractor Power Thresher Industry
1983 1988 1983 1988 1983 1988
EPR(%) 19.94 15.96 5.66 40.84 7.29 37.95
DRC* **" 22.05 29.19 35.12 54.48 34.35
DRC/SER *** 0.84 2.10 1.33 3.92 1.30
DRCM** *** 25.94 52.15 3869 199.20 37.94
DRCM/OER *"* 1.23 4.69 1.83 17.93 1.80
Average TEC(%) .... 71.29 52.26
Notes:
*Domestic Resource Costs atShadow Prices
"*Dome_ Resource Costs atMarket P_ss
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ments in allocative efficiency and comparative advantage position of
the industry and its subsectors.
DRC/SER and establishment size
Table 15 tries to show the relationship between the DRC/SER
values and the establishment or plant size. It must be noted that due
to census data limitation, it could not be identified which ofthe plants
in 1983 remained in 1988, therefore the corresponding DRC/SER
movements between the the two points of reference could neither be
determined.
In 1983, three small-scale plants in the hand tractor subsector
were recorded as dissavers of foreign exchange, while one was an
inefficient user.•However, the scenario changed in 1988 wherein
three were socially efficient among the four small-scale plants, while
the remaining firm was not.
In the power thresher subsector, there was only onemedium-scale
manufacturer in 1983, and it was inefficient. By 1988, this medium-
scale producer was not registered anymore. Among the 16 small-
scale plants in 1983, five were efficient, seven were moderately
inefficient, one was inefficient and three were dissavers of foreign
exchange. However, small-scale socially efficient plants increased to
13 in 1988. In addition, two were moderately inefficient and seven
were recorded as inefficient.
DRC and EPR
To relate the DRC and the EPR between 1983 and 1988, the
subsector that received a lower EPR registered alower DRC estimate
as expected. This would indicate that plants in the hand tractor
subsector were forced to adopt efficient measures to allocate re-
sources in order to survive in the industry. In the case of the power
thresher subsector, the increase in the EPR resulted in an increase in
the DRC estimate, marking inefficient performance. However, when
its DRC was compared with SER, it became moderately inefficient
in 1988, compared with its inefficient performance in 1983. In
general, these results would imply that the Trade Reform has




Distribution ofEstablishments byEmployment (byDRCISER ratios)
NumberofEstablishments
0
EstabF_shmentStze O<DRCISlER _<!2 1.2<DRC/SER_<t.5 DRCISER >1.5 DRC/SER<_ 0 __.
(Empioyrnent) _ Moderate Irlefll_lent Inetficient Dissaving Foreign "_ (P
Exchange Total `2




Small (5-99) -- 3 -- •-- 1 1 3 -- 4 4
Medium (100-199)
Sub-Total -- 3 -- -- 1 1 3 -- 4 4
Power Ihresher
Small (5-99) 5 13 7 2 t 7 3 -- 16 22
Medium (100-199) ..... 1 -- -- -- 1
Sub-Total 5 13 7 2 2 7 3 -- 17 22
Industry
Small (5-99) 5 16 7 2 2 8 6 -- 20 26
Medium (100-199) .... 1 -- -- -- 1
Total 5 16 7 2 3 8 6 -- 21 26
Source: Computed from _eCensus ofEstablishments, 1983 and 1988. National Statis_ OiTce. o>
¢D70 _ FrancesMyraC.Trabajo
objective of increasing incentives to neglected subsectors/industries
at the lower end of the protection scale.
Likewise, the relative efficiency performance of the subsector or
industry can perhaps be partly attributed to the changes in the market
structure. Increased internal competition due to the TRP could have
induced plants to be efficient in order to keep their place in the market.
Survey data, 1986 and 1991
The results from the survey, covering the period 1986 and 1991,
also followed a similar trend with that of the results from the Census
data for 1983 and 1988 (Table 16). Such movement though only
points to two firms which have 1986 and 1991 information because
the rest of the firms started their operations after 1986. These two
firms were socially efficient or low cost users of foreign exchange in
1991, indicating comparative advantage. Among firms with only
1991 data, two were efficient in social terms while only one was
moderately inefficient.
Firms One and Two have been in the business since 1964 and
1976, respectively. Firms Four and Five started their operations in
1988, while the remaining firm entered later in 1991. As can be
observed, firms that have been in the market longer were relatively
more efficient than those firms who entered the industry much later.
Efficiency might have been due to the cost-cutting measures the old
firms adopted through the years that they have been in the market.
The data also indicate the entrance of efficient plants during the
period of the Trade Reform.
All firms began as micro-scale operators and allare family-owned
and -managed. In addition, all firms produced a number of agricul-
tural machines and equipment, but the main product line of Firms
One and Two is power thresher, while the rest is hand tractor.
All of the fn-ms claimed that they were very greatly affected by
the institution of the value added tax (VAT) because such a policy
increases the prices of raw materials. As aresult, they had to raise the
prices of their end-products in order to stay in business. Also, all the





Efficiency LevelsofSome Respondents: 1986 and1991 5'
,2
FirmI Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm4 Firm5 5"
r-,
1986 1991 1986 1991 1991 1991 1991
DRC 34.05 26.45 13.81 16.02 42.15 32.07 31.29
DRCfSER 1.27 0.80 0.51 0.49 1.28 0.97 0.95
DRCM 51.16 31.75 i 3.84 14.79 49.41 36.24 40.01
DRCM/OER 1.55 0.96 0.64 0.54 1.50 1.09 1.21
Note: Firms 3,4and5started production opera_ons alter 1986.
Source: Survey Data andFinancial Statemenls from theSecurities andExchange Commission (SEC), 1986 and1991.72 _ FrancesMyraC.Trabajo
directly feel its probable effects on their operations, except for one
firm whose ratio of imported to local inputs is higher than the rest.
Technical Efficiency
Since both subsectors of the industry used the same technology
(i.e., using the same manpower, technical skills, and fabrication
equipment in the manufacturing process), they were lumped together
to derive the averag_ or the industry's TEC. The calculation obtained
an average TEC of 71.29 percent and 52.26 percent in 1983 and 1988,
respectively. The 1983 average TEC was just slightly below the
qualified efficient range of 75-100 percent, suggesting that the indus-
try was not far from the industry's "best practice." Unfortunately,
the picture changed differently in 1988 wherein the industry became
technically inefficient.
The contrasting movement of the industry's DRC estimate and
TEC between 1983 and 1988 implies that although the industry was
efficient in allocating its resources, it was not able to use these
resources efficiently. This conflicting evidence may be due to the fact
that DRC measure has more to do with the opportunity costs of
resource misallocation, while TEC measure has more to do with
plant-specific factors, such as, the level of technology and the man-
agement techniques employed.
Another possible reason for the contrasting movement of the
industry's DRC and TEC measures is that some of the efficient plants
in the industry may have imi_roved in their technical efficiency more
than the others, thereby widening the average gap between actual and
maximum possible output. It is also plausible that the more efficient
plants had a lesser share in industry output, thereby affecting the
average TEC.
Nonetheless, the evidence showed the importance of plant-specific
or non-price factors on technical efficiency. Technical inefficiency in
1988 may be attributed to the following problems enumerated by a
number of firms inthe industry: (a)low demand due to lack of financing
for farmers who wanted to mechanize; (b) sub-standard quality of
locally-sourced inputs; and (c) outmoded production technology. AsAgricultural Machinery Industry b 73
noted in Chapter5, industrysourceshave indicatedthe need to upgrade
production technology which would involve a substantial amount of
money for researchanddevelopment(R&D).
Factor Productivity and Intensity
The variation in performance among firms or subsectors and
changes in performance indicators can perhaps be explained by factor
productivity and intensity (Table 17). Firms or subsectors in an
industry differ in their relative use of capital and labor resources. For
this study, capital and labor productivities were computed based on
the value of output and census value added (both in real terms). On
the other hand, capital intensity was obtained from the ratio of capital
(at replacement cost) to labor.
Apossible explanation for the general improvements ofthe DRCs
in both subsectors and the industry as a whole in 1988 is the rise in
capital productivities. In particular, there was a very high growth in
the hand tractor subseetor's capital productivities. That is, capital
productivity in terms of its value of output per capital went up from
0.03 in 1983 to 1.38 in 1988, while its census value added per capital
increased from 0.02 in 1983 to 0.18 in 1988. Capital productivity in
terms of its value of output per capital of the power thresher subsector
also expanded, from 0.09 in 1983 to 0.25 in 1988. In addition, its
census value added per capital went up to 0.10 in 1988 from 0.05 in
1983.
As regards labor productivities, the hand tractor subseetor re-
corded reductions in terms of its value of output per worker and
census value added per worker between 1983 and 1988, at 35.09
percent and 87.33 percent, respectively. Power thresher subsector, on
the other hand, improved in 1988 by 60.05 percent in terms of value
of output per worker and by 12.80 percent in terms of census value
added per worker. At the aggregate level, labor productivity in terms
of value of output per worker improved by 37.57 percent in 1988 but
it registered a 14.55 percent fall in terms of its census value added
per worker. The general reduction in labor productivities could have
influenced the average TEC since technical efficiency is associated.b,
A
Table 17
Factor Productivity andIntensity: 1983 and1988
Hand Tractor Power Thresher Industry
1983 1988 1983 1988 1983 1998
Capital ProducUvity
Value ofoutput/capital 0.03 1.38 0.09 0.25 0.06 0.28
Census value added/capital 0.02 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.10
Labor Productivity
Value ofoutputhvorker 24,887 16,155 19,304 30,897 20,192 27,778
Census value added/worker 16,845 2,135 10,766 12,144 11,733 10,026
Capital Intensity -1-1
Capital-labor ratio 801,464 11,717 221,326 123,708 313,620 100,014 _-,
o')
,<
Note: Valueof output, census valueadded andcapital (atreptausment cost)inconstant 1972pdces. C)
Source: Computed from CensusofEstablishme_ 1983and1968.NadJonal StatistJus Office. --I
._.
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with plant-specific factorssuch asthe level of technology andman-
agement style.
Concerning capital-labor ratio or capital intensity, the ratios for
each subsector at the industry level dropped markedly in 1988.
However, the fall in the power thresher subsector's capital intensity
was not asmuch as what the othersubsector had experienced due to
its heavy capital expenditures.
It couldbe inferred fromthe aboveresults that capitalproductiv-
ity is inversely related to capital-labor ratio. That is, a substantial
decrease in the capital-labor ratio had caused a corresponding in-
crease in capital productivity.
Results showed that the subsector with a more favorable DRC
estimate (i.e., hand tractor subsector in this case) in 1988registered
a higher capital productivity, lower labor productivity, and a lower
capital intensity ratio. The latterindicates labor-intensivenessin the
subsector's/industry's production process. Thus, more utilization of
laborwould have a major influenceon efficiency.
COMPETITIVENESS/COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
While comparativeadvantagerefersto socialprofitability,com-
petitive advantagerefers to private profitability. Onewayof measur-
ing competitive advantage or international competitiveness is
through the DRCin market prices (DRCM). Inthis case, theDRCM
is compared with the official exchange rate (OER) to determine
whether a firm or an industry-has competitive advantage or not. In
defining competitive advantage,the samequalifications incompara-
tive advantage areused.
Table 14 illustrates that the DRC estimates in market prices
followed the same pattern with that of the DRCs in shadow prices,
but with highervalues, which reflectthe existence of market distor-
tions. It is important to recall that both estimates only differ in the
numerator of the DRC equation wherein the DRCM used actual
prices, meaning its numerator was undeflated. As such, distortions76 _ FrancesMyraC.Trabajo
present in the market also stem from the domestic tax system as well
as from the country's wage structure.
In 1988, the hand tractor subsector was moderately inefficient
and thus moderately profitable in private terms as revealed by its
DRCM/OER ratio of 1.23. This result is quite an improvement from
the subsector's dissaver position in 1983. On one hand, the other
subsector remained inefficient even in 1988. At the aggregate level
meanwhile, the industry was still inefficient in 1988. Nevertheless,
there had been improvements in the subsector's/industry's competi-
tive advantage between 1983 and 1988.
Although the hand tractor subsector was efficient in social terms
in 1988, it was moderately inefficient in private terms. This implies
that the subsector was not earning some profits due to market
distortions already cited. In comparison, the hand tractor subseetor
still exhibited a competitive edge over the power thresher subsector.
The DRCM results using data from the survey are also shown in
Table 16. Firms One and Two also followed a downward trend but
they were earning profits. Firm Five was also privately efficient while
the remaining two firms were just moderately inefficient in private
terms.
COMPARISON WITH THE AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY
INDUSTRY OF THAILAND
The agricultural machinery industry of Thailand has the same
general background with that ofthe Philippines'. Except for two-axle
tractors (or large tractors) and a few technically advanced units,
majority of farm machinery and equipment in Thailand are locally
produced. Machine designs are also copied and modified to suit local
physical conditions and tastes. The production technology is also
highly labor-intensive. Most of the manufacturing firms are small and
family-owned and -managed. Import tariffs are lower for completely-
built-up (CBU) machines than its imported material inputs, such as
sheet metal and bearings to mention a few.AgriculturalMachineryIndustry I_ 77
However, the agricultural machinery industry of Thailand man-
aged to achieve a high growth rate than the Philippines ever did. One
of the major contributing factors is the efficient as well as the
adequate distribution of agricultural machinery and fuel and a good
maintenance and repair system (Rijk 1989). The presence of these
factors is encouraged by the extensive and well-maintained road
network and efficient transport system of Thailand. In addition, the
active involvement of the private sector in supply and maintenance
also helped a lot. In the Philippines, however, inadequate technical
back-up of after-sales services and inavailability of spare parts have
dampened the farmer's desire for agricultural machines. Long ma-
chine downtimes have adversely affected the farmer's income and,
as a result, have affected his capability to meet on schedule the
amortization payments on his agricultural machinery loans. Another
contributing factor to the growth of Thailand's agricultural machin-
ery industry is the credit-in-kind scheme of the Bank for Agriculture
and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). The BAAC was established
in 1980 and has since then become the most important marketing
channel for BAAC-registered local manufacturers to distribute and
sell their products. Aside from this, BAAC's lending operations also
extend on a cash basis, thereby making the acquisition of farm
machines less burdensome. Moreover, Thailand's higher demand for
agricultural machinery and equipment is mainly in response to the
demand for more power input as a result of rapid area expansion




THIS study analyzwedthe structure, performance and competitive-
ness of the Philippine agricultural machinery industry in the light of
the Trade Policy Reform which was initiated in the early 1980s.
The findings of the study revealed that the TRP had considerably
rationalized the protection structure of the industry and its subsectors
between 1983 and 1988. Although both subsectors and the industry
as a whole received low levels of effective protection, they have
managed to improve their allocative efficiency, comparative advan-
tage, and competitive advantage position. These results somehow
disclose the indigenous innovation the domestic firms of the industry
have exerted in order to survive and stay in the market. However,
their effort has not been substantial enough to bring the industry to
the level of technical efficiency where in fact, the average technical
efficiency coefficient (TEC) of the industry has plummeted. The
manufacture of agricultural machinery was near the industry "best
,practice" in 1983, but it veered away in 1988.
Albeit improvements in allocative efficiency and competitive-
ness were obtained between 1983 and 1988, technical efficiency of
the industry showed a different picture. This conflicting movement
of the DRC and TEC measures could be attributed to the fact that the
former has more to do with the opportunity cost of resource misallo-
cation, while the latter has more to do with the plant's level of
technology, management style and other plant-specific factors. An-
other possible explanation would be the change in the discrepancy
between the actual and potential output of the industry due to the
instance in 1988 wherein some of the efficient plants improved their
technical efficiency more than the others. Added to this, or another80 4 Frances MyraC.Trabajo
explanation might be that the shares of the more efficient plants were
lesser during that time.
The improvements in allocative efficiency and competitiveness
could be traced to the changes in the industrial market structure. Both
concentration ratios used in the study declined between 1983 and
1988, and a parallel movement was exhibited by the price-cost
margin, which indicates less profitability, weak market power, and
low presence of barriers to entry in the industry. Hence, increased
internal (domestic) competition could have conditioned the behavior
of firms in the slabsector or industry, t
However, the study only covered the period until the transition
towards the post-trade reform (since the TRP will be concluded in
1995) and thus the results outlined above only entail the adjustment
process of the firms in the subsector or industry. Although these
results were only partial in the light of the Trade Policy Reform,
positive effects on the efficiency performance, particularly allocative
efficiency, and competitiveness of the agricultural machinery indus-
try could be gleaned. As such, the reduction oftariff rates on the input
side is commendable since the industry still depends on some im-
ported items like bearings and chains to mention a few. Such a stance
will not only benefit the industry but the economy as awhole because
inefficient local producers of material inputs will be forced to adopt
appropriate measures in producing quality products to counteract the
surge in import penetration.
The results of the study also showed the importance of non-price
factors. One of the most prevalent demand constraints which have
plagued local manufacturers, thereby threatening the growth of the
industry is the limited access to credit or financial resources for
farmers who desire to mechanize their agricultural technology. Credit
assistance is needed due to low purchasing power of the majority of
farmers who are into small-scale farming. The creation of a more
rational credit scheme for small-scale farmers as well as manufactur-
ers is thus suggested.
More research and development efforts must also be spent on
upgrading the production technology of the industry as well as its
product designs m not only onthe output side must attention be givenAgricultural Machinery Industry p, 81
but on the after-sales capability of the firms in the industry as well.
Lack of machine spare parts and inferior quality products have
plagued end-users. In comparison, the rapid growth of Thailand's
agricultural machinery industry is attributed to the availability of
quality standard raw materials, machine parts, and components.
Aside from these, Thailand also provides a good maintenance and
repair system. The Philippines should learn from Thailand's experi-
ence.
Moreover, the future of the industry lies on the will of the
government to pursue and concretize its agro-industrialization objec-
tives. The creation of the Philippine Agricultural Mechanization
Program Act is one good factor, if properly implemented, for the
growth of the industry.Select Bibliography
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Institutional Support System
DA-IRRI Industrial Extension Program
Launched in 1980, the Program was a joint effort of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture (DA) and the International Rice Research Insti-
tute (IRRI). It was initially funded by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) until 1987. However, its func-
tions are being continued by the Agricultural Engineering Division
of the DA's Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI). The Program alms to
promote the local manufacture of IRRI-designed agricultural ma-
chines and equipment in a wider scope. It also provides technical
assistance to both farmers and manufacturers.
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)
The Institute,through its Agricultural Engineering Division, has
been doing research and development studies on appropriate agricul-
tural mechanization technologies. Through the DA-IRRI Program, it
provides free blueprints of agricultural machine designs to any inter-
ested individuals for commercial production and marketing.
Committee on Agricultural Mechanization (CAM)
By the abolition of the Agricultural Mechanization Inter-Agency
Committee (AMIC) in 1991, CAM was created incorporating some
of the functions of AMIC. CAM is being handled by the DA's
National Agriculture and Fishery Council (NAFC). The committee,
as a consultative forum, aims to consolidate all efforts made by
private and public agencies concerning agricultural mechanization
technologies.88 .11 FrancesMyraC.Trabajo
Agricultural Mechanization Development Program (AMDP)
AMDP was established in 1979 as a seal of commitment to its
membership to the United Nations Regional Network for Agricul-
tural Machinery (RNAM).
Agricultural Machinery Testing and Evaluation Center
(AMTEC)
To set quality andperformance standards for agricultural machin-
ery and equipment, the DA, in cooperation with the University of the
Philippines at Los Bafios, established AMTEC in 1977. This was in
response to the provision of the fourth credit line of the CB-IBRD
Credit Program. The center also formulates test procedures and
conducts evaluation of after-sales capabilities of local firms. In the
process, AMTEC contributes to the improvement and redesigns of
existing agricultural machines.
Technical Committee on Machinery for Agriculture and
Fishery (TC#19)
TC #19 is responsible in formulating product quality standards
under Philippine conditions. This was created by the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) under the Bureau of Product Standards
(BPS) in 1984 in response to the need to give farmers/end-users more
protection from 'fly-by-night' manufacturers. TC #19 works hand-
in-hand with AMTEC.
Agricultural Machinery Manufacturers and Distributors
Association (AMMDA)
The association, composed of local manufacturers and distribu-
tors, was organized in 1964. It is recognized asthe official spokesman
of the agricultural machinery and equipment industry in the country.AgriculturalMachineryIndustry b. 89
Appendix 2
Agricultural Mechanization Statistics ofthePhilippines: 1985-1986
Total population (inmillion) 56.002
Farming population (inpercent) 59.50
Total area(inmillion ha) 30.00
Cultivated area(inmillion ha) 8.40





Average rice yield (t/ha) 2.67













Note: n.a.= Information notavailable.




CB-IBRD LoanGrants forFarm Machinery asofJune 30,1980 (InPO00)
First Second Third Fourth
(1966-1968) (1969-1973) (1974-1977) (1978-1980) Total
Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value
Four-wheel b'actors 1,694 92,910 1,952 180,226 688 100,432 9,749 457,040
2,080 18,851
Power _lters 942 12,477 1,191 24,547 1,202 27,597 -
IrrigalJon systems and 279 982 318 2,912 233 2,719 40 875 870 7,488
wells anddiskibulJon works
Sprayers, grain driers, 38 236 43 763 63 1,371 46 2,133 190 4,503
threshers andother farm
machinery -n
Rice mills ...... 345 23,095 345 23,095
Total 2,397 20,069 2,997 109,062 3,439 208,863 2,321 154,132 11,154 492,126 o'J
a:
Note: FirstRuralCreditProjectcovers fn_emaliongl BankforReconstruclion andDevelopme_(IBRD)andCenbrat Bank(CB)fundson_ rwhiletheSecond,Third andFourth Rma} C)
Credits Projects coverIBRD,CBAND RB/SLAfundsatprescribed propodion. --I
Source: Sycip, Gorres, VelayoandCo.andUniversity ofthePhil_pines Business Research Founda_ou, CB-IBRDFarmMec_izaf_onStudy. _o"
i o